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DON’T MIND THE GAP: THE RISE OF 
INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT MECHANISMS 
WITHIN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES 
ALEXANDRA R. HARRINGTON 
INTRODUCTION 
An iconic message of the London subway system is its warning to 
passengers to “mind the gap,” or, in other words, to be careful of the space 
between the platform and the subway train.1 This simple warning is 
applicable in many contexts. It has been particularly applicable to 
individuals in the international human rights law context. Traditionally, 
there has been a large gap between the human rights afforded to individuals 
as a matter of international law and the state-based ability to enforce these 
rights. However, the rise in the creation and use of individual complaint 
mechanisms as a part of international human rights treaties has created a 
significant challenge to the maintenance of this gap. 
As this article will explain, the increase in the creation of these 
procedures for specific groups through specific conventions indicates an 
attempt to close the gap into which individuals with a human rights-based 
grievance usually have fallen, despite the essential nature of the rights 
guaranteed in such foundational documents as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. This rise also indicates that individuals per se are being 
provided with a greater ability to close the gap by accessing the 
international human rights law system that has for so long regarded them as 
only peripheral actors to be given rights rather than as actors having the 
agency to claim these rights at the international level. In sum, the result is a 
steady penetration of the international system by individuals. Still, this 
access is designed by traditional international actors and therefore has 
 
              Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University; Doctor of Civil 
Law Candidate, McGill University Faculty of Law. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 
2009 McGill Law Faculty Graduate Students’ Association Conference in Montreal, Canada. The author 
wishes to thank her family for their comments on this article. She also wishes to thank Kate Hunter, 
Jenna Feistritzer, and the staff of the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law for their 
assistance with this article. 
 1.  Signs informing passengers to “Mind the Gap” can be seen throughout the London subway 
system and have spawned an artistic movement centered on their content. 
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structural limitations. While some gap might indeed remain, increased 
access has demonstrated that individual complaint mechanisms, and those 
persons willing to utilize them to claim their international human rights, are 
closing the gap. 
Part I of this article provides a brief discussion of the international 
human rights system generally and presents the concept of providing for an 
individual complaint mechanism within an international human rights 
treaty. Part II then discusses the individual complaint mechanisms that 
exist—or will exist—within key international human rights law treaties, 
specifically the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (CMW), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD). 
Part III of this article compares the status, rights, and abilities of 
individuals under each of the human rights treaties. This Part argues that 
there is a discernible trend in the increase of asserted rights and claimed 
abilities of individuals through the expansion of individual complaint 
mechanisms. With the necessary background and a comparison of 
individual complaint mechanisms established, Part IV then examines 
individual access to the international human rights system and discusses the 
implications of this trend for the individuals themselves and the 
international human rights law system as a whole. 
Although the state-centric nature of the international legal system 
necessarily results in a state-centric structure for individual complaint 
systems, Part IV argues that the increasing prominence of the individual in 
international human rights law is a discernible trend which stands to alter 
the current understanding of the international system. This prominence is 
based on a sense of individual empowerment which is greater than any one 
articulation of individual rights in the traditional sources of international 
human rights law. This Part goes on to argue that the increase in individual 
prominence is certainly laudable but that, by attaching this increased 
individual penetration of the international human rights law system to an 
ever-increasing series of specialized conventions, there is a significant risk 
of fragmenting the concept of the international human rights law system. 
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This Part suggests that a better alternative would be for individuals, as 
the foundation of international human rights law, to be able to access the 
system based on their identity as the holder of human rights and human 
dignity, rather than due to some specialized avenue of redress. This is 
especially so because these concepts of essential human rights and human 
dignity are at the core of the entire international human rights law system. 
This recommendation stresses both the internal status of people as holders 
of human rights and human dignity while also doing away with the need to 
create new quasi-judicial structures that are themselves potentially limiting 
depending on the ways in which they are drafted and function. Whether the 
appropriate body to handle such a concept is the Human Rights Committee 
or another body is not the overall concern of this article; rather, this article 
highlights an important trend in international human rights law and 
discusses the potential impacts of this trend on the international law 
system. Underlying this discussion is the overall question of how the ability 
of an individual to assert his human rights in an international legal context 
impacts the international community, the idea of state-centricity, and the 
understanding of international human rights law. At the individual level, 
the underlying question is whether individual identity, which is reinforced 
through access to the international human rights law system, is threatened 
by the fragmentation often related to asserting individual human rights 
violations. 
Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the previous Parts and asserts that 
the international human rights law system has created a system wherein the 
individual has been empowered to the point of having a voice. The 
individual can now use that voice in order to claim a place—however 
limited—within the realm of international human rights law in a way that is 
at once quite important structurally and yet can also fragment individual 
identity when not understood holistically within the international human 
rights law system. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
The modern international human rights system is generally regarded 
as the product of World War II and the immediate post-war era,2 although 
the antecedents of this system can be traced to the League of Nations.3 In 
the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), the foundational document 
for the United Nations, the concept of human rights, including the 
 
 2.  Kitty Arambulo, Drafting an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Can an Ideal Become Reality?, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 112-
13 (1996).  
 3.  See League of Nations Covenant art. 23.  
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recognition of human dignity, is prevalent,4 and this recognition has filtered 
through to the current organization and operation of the United Nations.5 
Several years after the adoption of the UN Charter, the world 
community endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
a sweeping statement recognizing and valuing the essential human rights 
and human dignities that are inherent in all persons.6 The rights recognized 
in the UDHR include civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.7 
Although it is, as a matter of law, a non-binding instrument, the UDHR is 
regarded as an instrument of customary law and thus is binding on the 
international community as a whole.8 
In the years following the adoption of the UDHR, the international 
community began to enshrine human rights in a series of treaties, most 
seminally the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.9 A 
variety of theories exist as to the political and legal motivations for splitting 
human rights into these two categories for the purposes of legalization,10 
and a full discussion of these theories is outside the scope of this article. 
What is important to note is that these treaties were wide-ranging 
individually and also when ratified collectively. The international human 
rights treaties discussed below state that the principles and essential human 
rights guarantees made under the two Covenants, as well as the UDHR and 
the UN Charter, form the backbone of their content.11 
Each of the international human rights treaties that contains an 
individual complaint mechanism is overseen in its implementation by a 
committee that is vested with the ability to decide on individual 
complaints.12 A note should be made here that, as with all international 
treaties and agreements, international human rights treaties are only 
binding on those states that have consented to be bound by them.13 Further, 
 
 4.  See generally U.N. Charter. 
 5.  See, e.g., Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/rights/ (last visited July 23, 
2011) (providing information on the involvement of the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies in 
human rights development and protection). 
 6.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).  
 7.  See id.; see also Arambulo, supra note 2, at 112-13 (describing the rights guaranteed by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).   
 8.  Arambulo, supra note 2, at 113. 
 9.  See Arambulo, supra note 2, at 113-14.  
 10.  See Arambulo, supra note 2, at 114-22.  
 11.  See infra Part II. 
 12.  See infra Part II. 
 13.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 11, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
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when an individual complaint mechanism is contained within the text of a 
treaty rather than adopted as an optional protocol, States Parties do not 
become bound by the individual complaint mechanism provisions unless 
they specifically express that they intend to be bound upon ratification or 
afterward.14 
As a general rule, the purpose of an individual complaint mechanism 
within a human rights treaty is to allow an individual, or the individual’s 
representative, or, in some circumstances, a group of individuals to 
complain to the treaty committee regarding alleged violations of the human 
rights contained within the terms of the treaty.15 The ability of an individual 
to bring such a complaint hinges first and foremost on whether the state 
alleged to have committed the violation is a State Party to the individual 
complaint mechanism.16  Once this hurdle has been cleared, the individual 
then must satisfy the standing and justiciability requirements contained in 
the text of the instrument creating the individual complaint mechanism.17 
The treaty committee may dismiss the complaint on grounds of 
inadmissibility, or it may decide to hear the complaint in full, after which it 
can still dismiss the case on inadmissibility or can decide the case on the 
merits.18 There is no appeals process once the treaty committee has made a 
decision on a complaint, rendering the decision of the treaty committee 
final.19 
 
 14.  The terms of each human rights treaty provide the exact methods by which a State Party may 
agree to be bound under the individual complaint mechanism established in the overall treaty.  
 15.  See infra Part II.  
 16.  See infra Part II. 
 17.  See infra Part II. 
 18.  See infra Parts II, III.  
 19.  See generally Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter 
Optional Protocol to ICCPR]; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter 
Optional Protocol to ICESCR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 
Jan. 16, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83 (entered into force 
Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to CEDAW]; Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT]; International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted Dec. 
18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2003) [hereinafter CMW]; Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to CRPD]. 
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In the event that a treaty committee decides in favor of the claimant, it 
has far less enforcement power than a domestic court.20 The treaty 
committee may publicly pronounce that there has been a violation21 and, 
depending on the depth of the violation, has issued language condemning 
the state practice that gave rise to it.22 The treaty committee may also 
require that the errant State Party follow up within a stipulated period of 
time and provide the treaty committee with information on the measures 
taken to address the violation.23 A further tool is to declare that the 
complainant is entitled to financial compensation for the wrongs done,24 
although an exact amount of compensation is not typically stated and such 
a finding is not enforceable in a domestic or international court.25 While the 
individual complaint mechanism exists under the rubric of international 
law, much of its direct impact on States Parties depends upon the attitude 
of the States Parties themselves, as some have been far more amenable to 
bringing the findings of treaty committees into the realm of domestic legal 
influence.26 
 
 20.  See generally Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19; Optional Protocol to ICESCR, 
supra note 19; CERD, supra note 19; Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19; CAT, supra note 
19; CMW, supra note 19; Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19; see also Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 33: The Obligations of State Parties Under the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5, 2008), at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm  [hereinafter Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 33].  
 21.  See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 33, supra note 20, para. 12; Wade M. 
Cole, When All Else Fails: International Adjudication of Human Rights Abuse Claims, 1976-1999, 84 
SOCIAL FORCES 1909, 1911-12 (2006) (discussing the prevalence of public shaming through the finding 
of a violation as a meaningful method of ensuring State Party compliance with a finding of the Human 
Rights Committee). 
 22.  See Judge v. Canada, Views, Human Rights Comm. 78th Sess., July 14-Aug. 8, 2003, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Oct. 20, 2003) (regarding the deportation of an individual to a state in 
which he would face the death penalty); Johnson v. Jamaica, Views, Human Rights Comm. 56th Sess., 
Mar. 18-Apr. 4, 1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/588/1994 (Aug. 5, 1996) (noting the Committee’s 
disapproval of the imposition of the death penalty where the ICCPR’s provisions are not respected 
during the trial). 
 23.  See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 33, supra note 20, para. 14. 
 24.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Philippines, Views, Human Rights Comm. 79th Sess., Oct. 20-Nov. 7, 
2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/D/868/1999 (Nov. 11, 2003). 
 25.  See, e.g., id. 
 26.  See Shotaro Hamamoto, An Undemocratic Guardian of Democracy – International Human 
Rights Complaint Procedures, 38 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 199, 200 (2007).  
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II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES CONTAINING 
INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT MECHANISMS 
A. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was 
adopted in 1966 and became effective in 1976.27 Although the provisions of 
the ICCPR are themselves comprehensive and manifest the collective 
understanding by the international community regarding the civil and 
political rights enjoyed by individuals,28 particularly as linked to the 
statements in the UDHR,29 the individual complaint mechanism established 
for the ICCPR is not contained in its main body.30 Rather, the individual 
complaint mechanism is located in the First Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR Protocol).31 
The ICCPR Protocol was also adopted in 1966 and became effective 
in 1976.32 As of the writing of this article, there are 167 States Parties to the 
ICCPR33 and 114 States Parties to the ICCPR Protocol,34 establishing both 
the ICCPR and the ICCPR Protocol as two of the most universally ratified 
conventions within the modern international law system. Under the terms 
of the ICCPR Protocol, jurisdiction to hear complaints from individuals 
who assert that they have been victims of violations of human rights 
guaranteed under the ICCPR is vested in the Human Rights Committee.35 
In order to assert such a complaint against a State Party, an individual must 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party,36 the meaning of which has 
caused no small level of controversy throughout the life of the ICCPR 
Protocol.37 
 
 27.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 28.  See generally id. 
 29.  See id. at pmbl.  
 30.  See generally id.   
 31.  See Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, arts. 1 to 5.   
 32.  See Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19; see also Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=IV-5&src=TREATY 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to ICCPR Summary].   
 33.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter= 
4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011).  
 34.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR Summary, supra note 32. 
 35.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, at pmbl., art. 1. 
 36.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 1. 
 37.  For a discussion of these issues, see Orna Ben-Naftali, The Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights to Occupied Territories, 100 PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC. OF INT’L L.) 90 
(2006).  
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Once a complaint is filed with the Human Rights Committee, the 
Committee reviews it for admissibility. In order to have standing to bring a 
complaint under the ICCPR, an individual must have exhausted all 
domestic remedies that are available to them in the context of the matter 
giving rise to the complaint.38 Furthermore, the complaint cannot be 
submitted by an individual anonymously,39 cannot fall into either category 
of “an abuse of the right of submission” or “incompatible with the 
provisions of the [ICCPR]” as determined by the Human Rights 
Committee,40 and cannot be pending before another international body or 
be the subject of a settlement as determined by an international body.41 
There is an exception to the domestic remedy exhaustion requirement: 
where the Human Rights Committee decides that there is an unreasonable 
delay in allowing the complainant to proceed with the requisite domestic 
remedies, the Committee may waive that prong of standing.42 
In recent years, there has been another admissibility hurdle where the 
individual bringing the claim is not the individual whom the State Party is 
alleged to have harmed.43 In this regard, the Human Rights Committee has 
been largely willing to grant standing to immediate family members of the 
alleged victim—particularly in cases of disappearance,44 alleged unlawful 
detention and torture,45 and extrajudicial killings46—but has been far more 
 
 38.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 2.; see also Mireille G.E. Bijnsdorp, The 
Strength of the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Women’s Convention, 18 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 
329, 331 (2000) (discussing the tie between resources available to potential claimants and their actual 
tendency to both follow the requisite domestic procedures and file international claims).  
 39.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 3.  
 40.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 3. 
 41.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 5. 
 42.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 5. 
 43.  See infra notes 44-48.  
 44.  See, e.g., Grioua, née Atamna v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights Comm. 90th Sess., July 9-27, 
2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1327/2004 (July 10, 2007); Kimouche, née Cheraitia v. Algeria, Views, 
Human Rights Comm. 90th Sess., July 9-27, 2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1328/2004 (July 10, 
2007); Bousroual v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights Comm. 86th Sess., Mar. 13-31, 2006, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/86/992/2001 (Mar. 15, 2006); Bautista v. Colombia, Views, Human Rights Comm. 55th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993 (Oct. 27, 1995); Izquiero v. Uruguay, Views, Human Rights Comm. 
15th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/73/1981 (Apr. 1, 1982). 
 45.  See, e.g., Bondonga v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Views, Human Rights Comm. 
96th Sess., July 13-31, 2009, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1483/2006 (July 30, 2009); Khuseynova & 
Butaeva v. Tajikistan, Views, Human Rights Comm. 94th Sess., Oct. 13-31, 2008, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/94/D/1263-1264/2004 (Oct. 20, 2008); Izquiero v. Uruguay, supra note 44; Khudayberganova 
v. Uzbekistan, Views, Human Rights Comm. 90th Sess., July 9-27, 2007, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/90/D/1140/2002 (Aug. 7, 2007);  Aber v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights Comm. 90th Sess., 
July 9-27, 2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1439/2005 (Aug. 16, 2007). 
 46.  See, e.g., Bazarov v. Uzbekistan, Views, Human Rights Comm. 87th Sess., July 10-28, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/959/2000 (Aug. 8, 2006); Bautista v. Colombia, supra note 44; Camargo v. 
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reticent to grant standing to those claiming to speak for a particular 
community or even where a physician or lawyer has lodged a claim on 
behalf of a patient47 or client.48 In these cases, the Human Rights 
Committee typically has been unable to substantiate that those other than 
immediate family members have the appropriate agency to speak for the 
alleged victim.49 What this practice highlights is that the ICCPR Protocol 
and the Human Rights Committee are focused on the individual and those 
directly affected by violations, rather than outside persons or groups. 
If a complaint survives the initial admissibility decision, it then goes 
before the Human Rights Committee for a decision on the merits. These 
decisions focus on the strength of the allegations made and, in light of the 
additional evidence that is provided at that point, frequently return to the 
issue of admissibility.50 In particularly dire situations, the Human Rights 
Committee has interpreted its mandate under the ICCPR Protocol to 
include the ability to request that the accused State Party take interim 
measures to guarantee the protection of the claimant.51 These requests have 
been prevalent in complaints involving the imposition of the death 
penalty.52 
The ICCPR Protocol permits a state to renounce its status as a party to 
the Protocol provided that it follows a specific procedure.53 The 
renunciation is not legally effective until three months after notification and 
 
Colombia, Views, Human Rights Comm. 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979 (Mar. 31, 
1982). 
 47.  See, e.g., L.A. & U.R. v. Uruguay, Views, Human Rights Comm. 18th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/18/D/128/1982 (Apr. 6, 1983). 
 48.  See, e.g., Palma v. Panama, Decisions, Human Rights Comm. 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/436/1990 (July 26, 1994); Thompson v. Panama, Decisions, Human Rights Comm. 52nd 
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/438/1990 (Oct. 21, 1994); Simons v. Panama, Decisions, Human 
Rights Comm. 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/460/1991 (Oct. 25, 1994); Leach v. Jamaica, 
Views, Human Rights Comm. 57th Sess., July 8-26, 1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/546/1993 (Aug. 1, 
1996); Y. v. Australia, Decisions, Human Rights Comm. 69th Sess., July 10-28, 2000, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/69/D/772/1997 (Aug. 8, 2000);  Padilla v. Philippines, Views, Human Rights Comm. 70th 
Sess., Oct. 16-Nov. 3, 2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999 (Oct. 19, 2000). 
 49.  See L.A. v. Uruguay, supra note 47; Palma v. Panama, supra note 48; Thompson v. Panama, 
supra note 48; Leach v. Jamaica, supra note 48; Y. v. Australia, supra note 48; Padilla v. Philippines, 
supra note 48.  
 50.  See, e.g., K.L. v. Denmark, Views, Human Rights Comm. 10th Sess., July 14-Aug. 1, 1980, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/10/D/72/1980 (July 31, 1980). 
 51.  Bijnsdorp, supra note 38.  
 52.  For a discussion of this trend in regards to complaints brought against Jamaica,Trinidad and 
Tobago in particular, and the resulting actions taken by these states to avoid agreement with the Human 
Rights Committee’s decisions, see Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International 
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002). 
 53.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 12.  
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does not void the applicability of the Human Rights Committee’s 
jurisdiction over cases already pending against the State Party.54 
B. International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) was adopted in 1966 and became effective in 1976.55 At the time 
of writing, there are 160 States Parties to the ICESCR.56 While there are 
many points at which the ICESCR mirrors the ICCPR, it is widely held that 
the terms of the ICCPR are quantifiable and thus subject to quasi-judicial 
oversight,57 while the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR are more fluid 
and essentially aspirational, making them inappropriate for quasi-judicial 
oversight.58 At the time they were adopted, there were also concerns that 
the rights contained in the ICESCR were new, or at least largely 
uncodified, at the national level, whereas the rights guaranteed under the 
ICCPR were typically found in the national laws of UN member states.59 
As a result, unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR did not contain direct 
provisions or a protocol creating an individual complaint mechanism.60 
Throughout the history of the ICESCR, and particularly over the past 
few decades, a mounting chorus of civil society actors, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR Committee), and some 
governments began to pressure the international community to create an 
individual complaint mechanism within the ICESCR context.61 In 
particular, the ICESCR Committee asserted that an individual complaint 
mechanism was necessary in order to develop an understanding of the 
terms contained in the ICESCR, to establish how these terms should be 
implemented, and to create an effective method for and forum in which 
 
 54.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 12. 
 55.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter 
=4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011).  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  See Tara J. Melish, Introductory Note to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 48 INT’L L. MATERIALS 256, 256-57 (2009); Michael J. 
Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be 
an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and 
Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 464-67 (2004); Wouter Vandenhole, Completing the UN Complaint 
Mechanisms for Human Rights Violations Step by Step: Towards a Complaints Procedure 
Complementing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 21 NETH. Q. 
HUM. RTS. 423, 431 (2003).  
 58.  See Melish, supra note 57, at 256-57; Dennis & Stewart, supra note 57, at 464-67. 
 59.  Arambulo, supra note 2, at 116.  
 60.  See Melish, supra note 57, at 256-57; Arambulo, supra note 2, at 113-17. 
 61.  See Melish, supra note 57, at 256; Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 425. 
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individuals could voice alleged violations of their rights.62 Others argued 
that the ICESCR would be unable to give effect and credence to the rights 
it created without an individual complaint mechanism.63 
Many of the issues associated with acceptance of an individual 
complaint mechanism focus on the collective or community-based nature 
of the rights provided for under the ICESCR.64 There is still a good deal of 
debate as to whether this will be detrimental to the implementation of a 
respected and well-functioning individual complaint mechanism under the 
ICESCR or whether the individual complaint mechanism will serve as a 
means to clarify that the rights and guarantees under the ICESCR are in 
fact primarily and essentially individual in nature.65 
During the drafting process that led to the creation of the ICESCR 
Protocol text, prominent human rights scholars attempted to draw distinct 
categories within each right under the ICESCR, such that there would be an 
obligatory element that could be made the subject of an individual 
complaint.66 These scholars asserted that the system would establish a 
softer set of elements and recommended state practices that would be 
beneficial to the implementation of each particular right but which would 
not create an obligation that would be sufficient to use as the basis for a 
complaint.67 Other arguments centered on the idea of establishing minimum 
levels of rights protections based on the importance of certain rights within 
the ICESCR.68 The ICESCR Protocol negotiation proceedings generated 
several other similar formulas regarding the levels of immediate and future 
state obligations for the purposes of justiciability.69 At heart, they all 
establish that there is such a dichotomy and that the ICESCR Protocol is 
intended to allow for an individual complaint mechanism that at the very 
 
 62.  See Melish, supra note 57, at 257.  
 63.  Dennis & Stewart, supra note 57, at 462; but see id. at 466 (stating the author’s views that the 
rights contained in the ICESCR are not in fact better off in a judicial setting and that empowering the 
ICESCR Committee to render judgments on the extent of obligations under the ICESCR is potentially 
dangerous as a practice).  
 64.  See Melish, supra note 57, at 259.  
 65.  Melish, supra note 57, at 259.  
 66.  See Arambulo, supra note 2, at 130-31.  
 67. Arambulo, supra note 2, at 131.  It should be noted that, despite the deeply held differences in 
state opinion regarding the justiciability of the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR, the international 
community and the states that comprise it do, with near unanimity, agree that the rights created under 
the ICESCR itself are essential human rights. See Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 430.  
 68.  Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 437-438.  
 69.  Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 443 (discussing several forms of obligation dichotomies, 
particularly the idea of the obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfill); Cees Flinterman, Appendix 
II: The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15 NETH. Q. 
HUM. RTS. 244, 247 (1997).  
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least holds States Parties accountable under the minimum obligation 
standards.70 
The preamble to the ICESCR Protocol depends heavily on the terms 
and guarantees of the UDHR and the ICCPR, as well as the ICESCR, 
emphasizing the individual and the rights guaranteed to him as a result of 
his essential human dignity.71 All States Parties agree to and recognize that 
“[c]ommunications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or 
groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be 
victims of a violation of any of the economic, social and cultural rights set 
forth in the Covenant by that State Party.”72 Those drafting the ICESCR 
Protocol specifically chose the term “victim” to ensure that the individual 
complaint mechanism would not be read narrowly in terms of standing, and 
to guarantee that the mechanism would have a broad construction into the 
future.73 In terms of standing, the ICESCR Protocol provides that an agent 
is only allowed to submit a complaint on behalf of another person with that 
person’s consent or, in the event that consent cannot be established, that the 
complainant provide a justification as to why consent is unavailable.74 
Jurisdiction over individual complaints brought under the ICESCR 
Protocol is vested in the ICESCR Committee.75 
Under the ICESCR Protocol, an individual complaint is not admissible 
if: all appropriate domestic remedies have not been exhausted (unless “the 
application of such remedies is unreasonably prolonged”);76 the complaint 
was submitted more than a year after the final exhaustion of appropriate 
domestic remedies (unless the complainant was demonstrably unable to 
comply with this limitation);77 the facts upon which the complaint is based 
occurred before the relevant State Party became legally bound by the terms 
of the ICESCR Protocol (unless the acts continued after the State Party 
became bound by the ICESCR Protocol);78 the subject of the complaint is 
pending before another international body or there was an examination of 
the subject of the complaint by another international body;79 the terms of 
the complaint are “incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant;”80 
 
 70.  Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 443.  
 71.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, at pmbl.  
 72.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2.  
 73.  Arambulo, supra note 2, at 132.  
 74.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2.  
 75.  See Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 1; Melish, supra note 57, at 257.  
 76.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(1).  
 77.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(a).  
 78.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(b).  
 79.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(c).  
 80.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(d).  
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there is insufficient evidence presented to substantiate the complaint or the 
complaint is “exclusively based on reports disseminated by  mass media;”81 
“[i]t is an abuse of the right to submit a communication;”82 or, the 
complaint is submitted anonymously or not in writing.83 The Protocol 
requires that a complaint allege a particular, individual harm, however 
there are certain limited circumstances in which this requirement can be 
softened to allow for admissibility where the ICESCR Committee decides 
that the complaint alleges “a serious issue of general importance.”84 
The ICESCR Protocol vests the ICESCR Committee with the ability 
to request that the State Party involved in a complaint take steps necessary 
to protect the life, integrity, and security of the complainant until there is a 
final decision on the complaint.85 Further, the Protocol explicitly requires 
that States Parties “take all appropriate measures to ensure that individuals 
under its jurisdiction are not subjected to any form of ill-treatment or 
intimidation as a consequence of communicating with the Committee.”86 
The ICESCR Protocol provides that States Parties are able to renounce 
their status as a party to the ICESCR Protocol and to withdraw from the 
ICESCR Protocol with the limitation that the renunciation does not become 
effective for six months.87 During that six-month time period, the ICESCR 
Committee may consider existing complaints against the renouncing State 
Party.88 
Due to the nature of the rights contained in the ICESCR, the ICESCR 
Protocol allows the ICESCR Committee to use a reasonableness standard 
when addressing whether a particular State Party is fulfilling its 
obligations.89 Additionally, the Protocol vests the ICESCR Committee with 
the ability to consult UN and other relevant bodies to receive information 
appropriate to its determinations.90 
 
 81.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(e).  
 82.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(f).  
 83.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(g).  
 84.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 4.  
 85.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 5(1).  
 86.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 13. 
 87.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 20(1).  
 88.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 20(2).  
 89.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 8(4).  
 90.  Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 8(3).  
HARRINGTON FINAL MACROB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2012  12:54 PM 
166 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 22:153 
C. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) was adopted in 1965 and entered into force 
in 1969.91 Although the CERD has been widely ratified by the global 
community,92 the individual complaint mechanism established under it has 
not been as successful in attracting States Parties.93  Indeed, the CERD 
individual complaint mechanism only became effective in 1982, when it 
received the requisite number of States Parties.94 
As with the ICESCR Protocol, states are concerned with the 
potentially broad and difficult to define (as well as limit) jurisdiction of an 
individual complaint mechanism established to hear alleged violations of 
the CERD, which has been drawn in a fluid manner to allow for a high 
amount of flexibility in its overall application.95 Interestingly, the opening 
paragraph of the CERD preamble contains a broad statement regarding the 
essential human rights and dignities of individuals and their place in non-
discrimination laws and protections, which itself can be seen as a vehicle to 
support the expansion of the role of the individual in the international 
system where violations of the CERD’s provisions occur.96 
The individual complaint mechanism is set out in Article 14 of the 
CERD.97 Under the terms of this mechanism, both individuals and groups 
of individuals have standing to bring complaints against States Parties to 
the CERD Committee, provided that the offense occurred within the 
jurisdiction of the relevant State Party and pertains to an alleged violation 
of the rights contained in the CERD.98 Unlike other international human 
rights treaties with individual complaint mechanisms, the CERD requires 
that a State Party indicate a domestic body that will be charged with 
examining the complaint first.99 In the event that there is no satisfaction 
 
 91.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ 
no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011) [hereinafter CERD Summary].  
 92.  To date, there are 175 States Parties to the CERD. See CERD Summary, supra note 91. 
 93.  See id. (providing the statements of States Parties that have become part of the individual 
complaint mechanism); see also William F. Felice, The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination: Race, and Economic and Social Human Rights, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 205, 213 
(2002).  
 94.  Rüdiger Wolfrum, The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 3 MAX 
PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 489, 511-13 (1999). 
 95.  Felice, supra note 93, at 213. 
 96.  See CERD, supra note 19, at pmbl.  
 97.  CERD, supra note 19, art. 14.  
 98.  CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(1).  
 99.  CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(2). 
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from this body, the CERD Committee may then exercise jurisdiction over 
the matter.100 Some States Parties elected to bypass this step and declare 
that the CERD Committee has jurisdiction without having to go through a 
domestic body first—a step which is allowable under the CERD and 
arguably promotes individual access to the international system since it 
results in an international body having jurisdiction.101 
The only justiciability requirement is that a complainant must have 
exhausted all applicable domestic remedies prior to bringing the complaint 
to the CERD Committee.102 This requirement can be waived when “the 
application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.”103 
States Parties are allowed to withdraw their assent to the CERD 
Committee’s jurisdiction over individual complaints without the usual 
waiting period for effectiveness,104 although the CERD ensures that a 
withdrawal may not impact any of the complaints pending before the 
CERD Committee prior to withdrawal.105 
D. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) entered into force in 1981 without any 
provisions relating to an individual complaint mechanism.106 In subsequent 
years, the idea of creating an individual complaint mechanism for CEDAW 
began to gain popularity, resulting in several high-level international 
workshops and meetings which sought to frame a potential optional 
protocol that would establish an individual complaint mechanism.107 
 
 100.  CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(5).  
 101.  CERD Summary, supra note91. 
 102.  CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(7)(a).  
 103.  CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(7)(a).  
 104.  CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(3).  
 105.  CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(3).  
 106.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for 
signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]; see 
also Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011) [hereinafter CEDAW Summary]. 
 107.  Kwong-Leung Tang, The Leadership Role of International Law in Enforcing Women’s 
Rights: The Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention, 8 GENDER & DEV. 65, 67-69 (2000); 
Bijnsdorp, supra note 38, at 330; see also Felipe Gomez Isa, The Optional Protocol for the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Strengthening the Protection 
Mechanisms of Women’s Human Rights, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 305 (2003) (discussing the 
generally accepted idea among the international community that it would be easier to craft an optional 
protocol for CEDAW to implement an individual complaint mechanism than to amend CEDAW itself).  
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Interestingly, the many official justifications for the proposed optional 
protocol tended to focus on benefits that would accrue to society and 
women’s rights as a whole, while largely overlooking the effects of 
bringing the individual herself into the realm of international human 
rights.108 Ultimately, these efforts bore fruit, and in 1999 an optional 
protocol providing for an individual complaint mechanism as part of 
CEDAW (CEDAW Protocol) was adopted.109 The CEDAW Protocol 
subsequently went into effect in 2000110 and currently has 102 States 
Parties.111 
The preamble to the CEDAW Protocol places heavy emphasis on the 
role of CEDAW and other key international human rights documents 
(particularly the UN Convention, the UDHR and the combination of the 
ICCPR and ICESCR) in crafting the system of international law under 
which the individual complaint mechanism for CEDAW could be 
created.112 
The CEDAW Protocol begins by establishing that States Parties 
recognize the CEDAW Committee as having the ability to receive 
complaints and also to make decisions regarding these complaints.113 
Specifically, the CEDAW Protocol provides that complaints “may be 
submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the 
jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of 
the rights set forth in the Convention by that State Party.”114 The CEDAW 
Protocol requires that complainants acting on behalf of another individual 
or group establish that they have received the consent of the person or 
group on whose behalf they claim to be acting. Nevertheless, a complainant 
is permitted to proceed if he is able to provide a sufficient explanation as to 
why he is acting without the appropriate consent.115 
The justiciability requirements for those seeking to bring complaints 
under the CEDAW Protocol are similar to those contained in other 
instruments establishing individual complaint mechanisms. All appropriate 
domestic remedies regarding the subject matter of the complaint must have 
been exhausted prior to bringing a claim under the CEDAW Protocol 
 
 108.  Tang, supra note 107, at 69.  
 109.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19. 
 110.  CEDAW Summary, supra note 106. 
 111.  CEDAW Summary, supra note 106. 
 112.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, at pmbl.; see also Tang, supra note 107, at 67 
(discussing the gender violence protections attributed to other international human rights instruments 
but not to CEDAW).  
 113.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 1.  
 114.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 2.  
 115.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19. 
HARRINGTON FINAL MACROB(DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2012  12:54 PM 
2012] DON’T MIND THE GAP 169 
“unless the application of such remedies is unreasonably prolonged or 
unlikely to bring effective relief.”116 In addition, the same issue cannot have 
been brought before another international body, nor can it be pending 
before another international body at the time the complainant brings the 
CEDAW Protocol-based complaint.117 Furthermore, the complaint cannot 
be “incompatible with the provisions of the Convention;”118 it cannot be 
“manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently substantiated;”119 it cannot be 
“an abuse of the right to submit a communication;”120 and the facts upon 
which the complaint is based cannot have occurred before the State Party 
was legally bound under the CEDAW Protocol, except in instances where 
the complained-of facts continued to occur after the State Party became 
legally bound under the CEDAW Protocol.121 
The CEDAW Protocol allows the CEDAW Committee to request that 
the State Party at issue take interim measures to protect the complainant(s) 
from harm until the outcome of the complaint.122 In a further step, the 
CEDAW Protocol explicitly requires that “[a] State Party shall take all 
appropriate steps to ensure that individuals under its jurisdiction are not 
subjected to ill treatment or intimidation as a consequence of 
communicating with the Committee pursuant to the present Protocol.”123 
Additionally, the CEDAW Protocol requires States Parties to provide their 
citizens with information on the Protocol, its terms, and the results of 
complaints brought before the CEDAW Committee that involve the State 
Party,124 thus empowering individuals through the dissemination of 
information. 
The CEDAW Protocol requires States Parties to give six months 
notice prior to renouncing and withdrawing from the Protocol.125 During 
that six-month period, complaints submitted to the CEDAW Committee 
prior to the notification date may still be decided.126 
 
 116.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(1).  
 117.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(a).  
 118.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(b).  
 119.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(c).  
 120.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(d). 
 121.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(e). 
 122.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 5.  
 123.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 11.  
 124.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 13.  
 125.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 19(1).  
 126.  Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 19(2).  
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E. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) was adopted in 1984 and 
entered into effect in 1987.127 Currently, there are 149 States Parties to the 
CAT, and sixty-five of these have also agreed to be bound by its individual 
complaint mechanism.128 The CAT itself provides for an individual 
complaint mechanism under Article 22.129 In line with the general trend, the 
preamble to the CAT reinforces the universality of human rights and 
dignities, especially those set forth in earlier international human rights law 
tenets.130 
States Parties to the CAT recognize the ability of the CAT Committee 
to consider complaints from individuals, or made on behalf of individuals, 
who are subject to the jurisdiction of the state and who allege that they are 
victims of a violation of the CAT by the State Party.131 In terms of 
justiciability, the CAT Committee cannot hear complaints that are made 
anonymously;132 complaints which it finds “to be an abuse of the right of 
submission . . . or incompatible with the provisions of [the CAT];”133 
complaints where the complainant has not exhausted all relevant domestic 
remedies, unless “the application of the remedies is unreasonably 
prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the 
victim of the violation;”134 or where the subject matter of the complaint has 
been or is being heard by another international body.135 
States Parties to the CAT are able to withdraw from the individual 
complaint mechanism at any time, although withdrawal does not prevent 
the CAT Committee from considering complaints that had been lodged at 
the time of the withdrawal.136 Found in a separate section of the CAT, 
Article 13 requires that States Parties against whom an individual makes a 
complaint of torture or related activities provide protection for that 
 
 127.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx? 
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011) [hereinafter CAT 
Summary]. 
 128.  CAT Summary, supra note 127. 
 129.  See CAT, supra note 19, art. 22.  
 130.  CAT, supra note 19, at pmbl.  
 131.  CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(1).  
 132.  CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(2).  
 133.  CAT, supra note 19. 
 134.  CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(4)(b).  
 135.  CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(4)(a).  
 136.  CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(8).  
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individual “against all ill-treatment or intimidation.”137 These protections 
are also extended to witnesses in such claims.138 
F. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW) was adopted in 
1990 and entered into force in 2003.139 An individual complaint mechanism 
was created under its core terms.140 
States Parties to the CMW individual complaint mechanism agree to 
allow the CMW Committee to hear complaints from or on behalf of 
individuals who are within the State Party’s jurisdiction and assert that they 
have been the victim of a CMW right-based violation by the State Party.141 
In order to be justiciable, a complaint brought before the CMW cannot be 
brought anonymously.142 The complaint cannot, in the view of the CMW 
Committee, be “an abuse of the right of submission . . . or [] be 
incompatible with the provisions of the [CMW].”143 Further grounds for 
non-justiciability include where the same subject matter has been brought 
or is before another international body,144 and where all relevant domestic 
remedies have not been exhausted (although this requirement can be 
waived where the CMW Committee finds that “the application of the 
remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief 
to that individual”).145 
The CMW provides that a State Party to the individual complaint 
mechanism can withdraw from it at any time, although a withdrawal will 
not terminate complaints pending against the State Party at the time of the 
withdrawal.146 
 
 137.  CAT, supra note 19, art. 13.  
 138.  CAT, supra note 19, art. 13.  
 139.  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en 
(last visited July 23, 2011). 
 140.  CMW, supra note 19, art. 77.  
 141.  CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(1).  
 142.  CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(2).  
 143.  CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(2). 
 144.  CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(3)(a).  
 145.  CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(3)(b).  
 146.  CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(8).  
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G. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
was adopted in 2006 and entered into effect in 2008.147 The CRPD itself 
does not contemplate an individual complaint mechanism;148 instead, the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD Protocol) was adopted as a separate instrument and also 
entered into effect in 2008.149 Of the 106 States Parties to the CRPD,150 64 
are currently parties to the individual complaint mechanism.151 
There was widespread international questioning as to the need for the 
CRPD since essentially it addresses rights that have already been enshrined 
as human rights.152 However, proponents successfully argued that these 
already existing rights were too broad to provide full protections to those 
with disabilities in particular.153 It should be noted that even proponents of 
the CRPD assert that the terms of the CRPD are impossible for most States 
Parties to implement immediately given that its terms run the gamut of 
civil, political, economic, cultural, and social rights.154 Thus, there is 
arguably a level of uncertainty regarding whether rights are best decided in 
a quasi-judicial setting that is similar to that of the ICESCR Protocol. 
Regardless of the stance one takes on this issue, however, it is difficult to 
deny that the CRPD and the CRPD Protocol represent a large step in 
advancing the individual within the sphere of international human rights 
law by allowing the individual to penetrate the international human rights 
law system in a meaningful way.155 
States Parties to the CRPD Protocol agree to recognize the jurisdiction 
of the CRPD Committee to hear complaints brought against them by either 
individuals or groups of individuals who are within the State Party’s 
 
 147. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV15&chapter= 
4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter CRPD Summary]. 
 148.  See generally Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted Dec. 13, 2006, 
2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008). 
 149.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19; see also Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15-a&chapter=4&lang=en 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to CRPD Summary]. 
 150.  CRPD Summary, supra note 147. 
 151.  Optional Protocol to CRPD Summary, supra note 149. 
 152.  Don MacKay, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 323, 323 (2007). 
 153.  Id. at 326-28. 
 154.  Id. at 330.  
 155.  See generally id.  
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jurisdiction and who allege a violation of the CRPD.156 The requirements 
for justiciability of a complaint are that the complaint not be made 
anonymously;157 that the complaint is not “an abuse of the right of 
submission” and is not “incompatible” with the CRPD;158 that the 
complaint has not been examined or is not under present examination by 
another international body;159 that all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted unless the exhaustion of these remedies is unreasonable or not 
likely to bring about meaningful relief to the complainant;160 that the 
complaint is not “manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently 
substantiated;”161 and that the events involved in the complaint happened 
after the date on which the State Party became bound by the CRPD 
Protocol, unless the events complained of continued to occur after the date 
on which the State Party became bound by the CRPD Protocol.162 
Following the trend in individual complaint mechanism creation, the 
CRPD Protocol allows the CRPD Committee to request that a State Party 
implement interim measures for the protection of the complainant prior to 
the CRPD’s final decision in a complaint.163 States Parties to the CRPD 
Protocol are able to denounce the CRPD Protocol and withdraw from it, 
although the renunciation will not become effective for a year.164 
III.  CONVENTION COMPARISIONS 
It is evident from Part II that there are many procedural similarities 
among the international human rights law treaties that contain individual 
complaint mechanisms. Indeed, there are telling similarities for the 
individual beyond the fact that the individual has the ability to bring a 
complaint before the relevant committee. 
Generally, the same standing requirements apply across the 
international human rights treaties, namely that the individual must be 
under the jurisdiction of a State Party to bring a complaint and that the 
violation alleged must be of a right contained in the appropriate treaty.165 
This requirement places limits on the individual’s ability to complain and 
 
 156.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note19, art. 1.  
 157.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(a).  
 158.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(b).  
 159.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(c).  
 160.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(d).  
 161.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(e).  
 162.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(f).  
 163.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 4.  
 164.  Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 16.  
 165.  See supra Part II.A-G. 
HARRINGTON FINAL MACROB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2012  12:54 PM 
174 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 22:153 
requires that the State Party itself demarcate who constitutes a person 
within its jurisdiction. Indeed, this issue has caused much debate at the 
international level in those situations where an individual, by asserting a 
violation, has triggered a massive juridical and theoretical undertaking to 
determine what it means to be within a state’s jurisdiction.166 
There is a split in the international human rights law treaties between 
those that only allow individuals to bring complaints,167 those that allow 
third parties to complain on behalf of individuals provided that certain 
circumstances are met,168 and those that allow individuals, groups of 
individuals, or groups acting on behalf of groups or individuals to bring 
complaints.169 In part, this procedural break could be a result of differences 
in the rights protected by each treaty: some human rights violations are 
essentially individual in nature, whereas others, such as racial 
discrimination, can be perpetrated against a group as well as against one 
individual. Regardless of these procedural differences, individual complaint 
mechanisms serve to reinforce the agency of the individual and the extent 
to which the individual, whether as a single claimant or as part of a group 
of individual claimants, has accessed international legal remedies. 
Additionally, those conventions which do require consent for agency 
representation reiterate the importance of the individual by seeking to 
ensure that complaints are not brought in a manner that could be regarded 
as frivolous or otherwise detracting from the seriousness of the allegations 
raised. 
Much the same can be said for the justiciability requirements that are 
standard across most of the international human rights law treaties 
discussed above.170 In several instances, international human rights law 
treaties contain fewer bars to justiciability,171 which increases the ability of 
individuals to assert their rights. Across the instruments, the justiciability 
provisions which allow the exhaustion of relevant domestic remedies 
requirement to be waived where a strict application of the requirement 
would in essence bar the individual from bringing a complaint are 
protective measures for the complainant.172 These provisions are crucial to 
 
 166.  See Ben-Naftali, supra note 37.  
 167.  See supra Part II.A (explaining that the general standing requirement under the ICCPR is 
centered on an individual); supra Part II.F. 
 168.  See supra Part II.A (explaining a recent spike in third parties given standing to assert claims 
when the injured party has been proven to be unavailable through no fault of his own); supra Part II.B, 
II.E. 
 169.  See supra Part II.C-D, II.G.   
 170.  See supra Part II.   
 171.  See supra Part II.C, II.F.   
 172.  See supra Part II.   
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enabling the individual to assert his rights at the international level when 
that individual’s ability to assert his rights domestically is thwarted by the 
State Party itself. 
At the same time, the common treaty provisions which bar an 
individual from bringing his claim before more than one international 
rights body at a time serve a dual purpose.173 As a purely practical matter, 
these provisions ensure that multiple cases will not be filed with multiple 
bodies, thus resulting in an uneven or confused outcome. The second 
consideration is discussed at greater length in Part IV below. By allowing 
an individual to bring his claim before only one international body, the 
combined international human rights treaties require the individual to select 
a single facet of his harm or identity under which to raise his claim, rather 
than allowing him to bring a holistic complaint that recognizes the entirety 
of his identity and the harms that he has suffered. 
Several international human rights law treaties contain provisions 
which either require States Parties to protect complainants and witnesses 
when they make assertions of wrongdoing at the international level,174 or 
allow the appropriate treaty committee to request that the State Party take 
interim measures to protect the complainant until the complaint is fully 
decided by that treaty committee.175 Perhaps the importance of these 
provisions to the individual is obvious. At the same time, these provisions 
are essential to the overall availability of the international human rights law 
system to individuals because they recognize the unique status of 
individuals as potential targets of state or state-sponsored retaliation or 
repression, whereas the same is not true in state-to-state complaints in other 
legal arenas. By allowing for these protections, the international human 
rights law treaties attempt to ensure some level of equality between states 
and individuals in terms of potential harms as a result of a treaty-based 
complaint.176 
The common provisions of the international human rights treaties that 
relate to the ability of a State Party to renounce and withdraw from the 
 
 173.  See supra Part II.   
 174.  See supra Part II.B, II.D, II.G.   
 175.  See supra Part II.A-B, II.D-E.   
 176.  Of course, to think that these provisions would automatically provide protection to those 
individuals who come forward with complaints would be naïve, especially in situations where the state 
is accused of gross human rights violations such as extra-judicial killings or disappearances. However, 
as a matter of drafting, these provisions do give an important window into the place of the individual as 
protected within the international human rights law system. These provisions also demonstrate the 
importance of the individual’s ability to assert his rights and to penetrate the international human rights 
law system. 
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individual complaint mechanism,177 and the effect that this has on pending 
individual complaints,178 is perhaps less obviously related to the penetration 
of the individual into the international human rights law system. Clearly, 
the terms of these provisions reflect the continued primacy of states in 
international law. They also reflect the importance attached to the 
international obligations undertaken by states in the international human 
rights realm in that they do not allow State Parties to suddenly withdraw 
from the jurisdiction of the relevant committee and also do not allow State 
Parties to use withdrawal as a way to stop the investigation of a complaint 
that has already been filed. In addition, they reflect the importance of the 
relevant treaty committee’s ability to consider individual complaints even 
where the State Party seeks to shield itself from such considerations. 
The more recent human rights treaties establishing individual 
complaint mechanisms tend to allow their respective committees to 
examine information from UN agencies and entities deemed relevant, as 
well as from other human rights organizations and even regional entities.179 
This further contributes to the fragmentation of the individual discussed in 
Part IV because it focuses the treaty committee’s attention on a particular 
facet of an individual’s identity and leads the committee to disregard other 
facets that may be relevant to the human rights violation. 
All of the international human rights law treaties that have individual 
complaint mechanisms share a common weakness in that the decisions of 
their respective committees cannot reliably be enforced at the domestic 
level.180 As such, it is widely acknowledged that the punitive and coercive 
abilities of these treaty committees are limited to shaming States Parties by 
announcing their culpability for human rights violations.181 Some states do 
have strong track records of implementing at least a good portion of treaty 
committee findings at the domestic level, while others are generally 
apathetic to the incorporation of these findings at the state level, often 
citing issues of sovereignty.182 Dismissing the punitive weaknesses of the 
individual complaint mechanism structure disregards the importance of the 
structure to the place of the individual within the international system. The 
individual’s ability to penetrate the international system lies not in his 
ability to receive compensation—monetary or non-monetary—from the 
State Party at the treaty committee’s request, but rather in the ability of the 
 
 177.  See supra Part II.   
 178.  See supra Part II.   
 179.  See, e.g., supra Part II.B.  
 180.  See supra Part II.   
 181.  See supra Part II.   
 182. See Helfer, supra note 52, at 1894.   
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individual to bring a state to account for its violations before an 
international body and an international audience. In this sense, the ability of 
the individual to complain against a state and to receive a finding from a 
treaty committee that is critical of the state and that acknowledges to the 
world the violations committed by the state is in itself a unique remedy. 
On a more theoretical level, it has been argued that the rise of 
international human rights law treaties which target certain issues or groups 
creates a “pluralization” within international human rights law, whereby 
the particular requirements of a group defined by a certain trait or standing 
within the community—for example those with disabilities—are given 
special protections beyond the existing human rights conventions.183 Under 
this model, there is an essential clash between human rights per se, which 
are defined as centering on “sameness and unity,”184 and more specific, 
group-oriented conventions with human rights law, which can be viewed as 
centering on the “difference and pluralism” of the groups being 
protected.185 From this supposition, it is then surmised that human rights 
themselves may also be used as instruments to examine the concept of 
identity as well as dignity within groups rather than within humanity 
itself.186 This is important to the comparison of the international human 
rights law treaties with individual complaint mechanisms because it applies 
as much to them and to the jurisprudence which they produce as to the 
overall international human rights treaty system. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL PENETRATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The idea of individual human rights, particularly as an outgrowth of 
the human rights violations that savaged the world during World War II, 
has become an anchor of the international legal system.187 As a field, 
international human rights law is centered on asserting the rights of all 
mankind and, subsequently, on ensuring that states guarantee and respect 
these rights.188 A primary way in which the system holds states accountable 
has been to grant individuals stature within the international community to 
 
 183.  Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or 
Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 494, 495 (2008).  
 184.  Id. at 496.   
 185.  Id.   
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Cole, supra note 21, at 1912 (“Postwar world culture endows individuals with tremendous 
amounts of moral worth and agency . . . .  It also invests them with universal human rights, admonishes 
states to respect and protect those rights, and, when necessary, authorizes individuals to defend their 
rights against state infringement.”). 
 188.  See Helfer, supra note 52, at 1842.  
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charge their governments with human rights violations. Thus, unlike other 
regimes of international law, there is an automatic place for the individual 
within the international human rights law system.189 
At least theoretically, the individual complaint mechanisms used in 
international human rights law allow individuals to bring their claims to a 
body that is regarded as less biased than domestic courts.190 These bodies 
also allow individuals whose voices are frequently not given attention or 
value at the domestic level to have greater power and influence in asserting 
their rights and claiming personal agency over the acts committed against 
them.191 The growth of the individual complaint mechanism within well-
accepted international human rights law treaties has resulted in the 
placement of the individual in a different sphere than has been traditionally 
accepted as part of the international system;192 and, consequently, has 
empowered a new set of international actors to gain a place of primacy. 
As an international actor in the human rights system, the individual is 
able to express his voice directly without the need to seek representation 
from a state or non-governmental organization. Specifically in this context, 
the individual has done more than equal traditional international actors; he 
has gained a place of primacy. Indeed, by definition, the individual is at the 
center of the individual complaint mechanism. Accordingly, a 
determination of the violations done to the individual takes precedence 
over other considerations which often characterize international legal 
adjudications, such as the wishes of the states involved. 
Some authors have studied the international human rights law system 
and argued that it is becoming “overlegalized,” creating a situation in 
which States Parties are under pressure to sign treaties but have difficulty 
fulfilling the legal responsibilities therein.193 This is particularly true where 
the treaty has been operative for a number of years and has been subject to 
interpretation by an oversight body.194 Although this argument has great 
merit in some respects, it tends to ignore, or at least undervalue, the place 
of the individual in the international human rights law system. It does this 
by placing the onus on the applicable oversight body as the instrument of 
change and treaty construction over time, and neglecting the impact of 
 
 189.  Id. (describing the right of individuals under human rights law to enforce international legal 
commitments through recourse to international courts and quasi-judicial bodies). 
 190.  See supra Part I.   
 191.  See Bijnsdorp, supra note 38, at 337.  
 192.  See Tang, supra note 107, at 67-68. 
 193.  See generally Helfer, supra note 52; id. at 1854-55.  
 194.  Id. at 1854-55. 
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individuals on both the relevant State Party and the international system as 
a whole. 
Some have asserted that the creation of new international human 
rights law treaties, and associated individual complaint mechanisms, works 
to reinforce the rights granted to individuals by fostering a series of 
interlocking understandings of international human rights law.195 In the 
same vein, it has been asserted that these systems work together and indeed 
must do so given the nature of the rights that are protected.196 However, this 
argument, while attractive, tends to undermine the idea of the universality 
of individual human rights and norms that is associated with such seminal 
documents as the ICCPR.197 Rather than creating a system in which the 
individual, though given a prominent role within the human rights system, 
is potentially subject to the jurisdiction of multiple treaties and their 
oversight bodies, perhaps the international community ought to amend the 
foundational documents of international human rights law, such as the 
ICCPR or the ICESCR, so that they cover a wider—or at least more in-
depth—spectrum of individual rights and protections. 
As has been noted, scholars have criticized the pluralization of 
international human rights law by treaties which create various 
communities or violations.198 This is an important observation and leads 
one to question the point at which the inviolable rights germane to all of 
mankind as envisioned by original human rights treaties ceases to be 
uniform and begins to fragment into sub-classifications of various human 
rights-based identities.199 
The rise of the individual as more than simply a passive subject and 
holder of rights, but rather as an entity that is able to assert—and thereby 
make a claim to—these rights demonstrates an evolution in the dynamics of 
the actors involved in the international rights law system. However, this 
evolution has been carefully tailored by the international human rights law 
system, as is evidenced by the justiciability and standing requirements 
which are nearly universal to the individual complaint mechanisms 
discussed above. A careful tailor can craft something that is as deceptive 
from the outside as it is from the inside. Similarly, a careful crafter of any 
 
 195.  See, e.g., Bijnsdorp, supra note 38, at 332 (describing the positive, stimulating influence 
which bodies dealing with the same issue of discrimination against women have on one another).  
 196.  Bijnsdorp, supra note 38, at 330-31.  
 197.  For an argument specifically discussing the overlaps in individual complaint mechanism 
bodies, see Dennis & Stewart, supra note 57, at 501-04.  
 198.  See Mégret, supra note 183 (analyzing the pluralization of human rights under the CRPD). 
 199.  Id. 
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international instrument can create a document that is at once expansive at 
first glance yet restrictive in terms of its actual implementation procedure. 
To the outside, individual complaint mechanisms are a state-centered 
way to ensure that States Parties are accountable for the obligations that 
they undertook as part of the international human rights law system. On the 
inside, however, the mechanism is a powerful tool for the individual—
whether directly or through representatives where necessary—to actively 
assert and claim his human rights. It cannot be denied that the punitive 
aspects of individual complaint mechanisms in the international human 
rights law context are weak and most often rely on the power of shame and 
international condemnation. This does not, however, defeat the importance 
of the ability of the individual to bring these cases in the first place and to 
at least generate some form of discussion on these topics. The importance 
of this individual role is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that, regardless 
of the treaty, states are unwilling to bring human rights law based 
complaints against other states.200 Thus, without the individual complaint 
mechanism, the horrors of state enforced disappearances and extra-judicial 
killings that have occurred under a variety of dictatorships would not be as 
well known to the world. It is only through this knowledge that the 
international community is forced to see many of the unpleasant truths that 
occur within it and to understand the impacts of these human rights 
violations on a very personal and intimate level that state-to-state dialogue 
does not generate. 
At the same time that individual infiltration of the international human 
rights law system is beneficial, it creates a danger of fragmentation. Here, 
the threat lies in the plethora of international human rights law treaty 
committees to which an individual might complain. Much as pluralization 
in the group context has a dangerous element to it, fragmentation of 
essential human rights and dignities into many international human rights 
law treaties with many venues for individuals to complain does not create a 
greater unity of understanding or guarantee of human rights. Nor does it 
allow the individual to fully assert and claim all of the human rights and 
dignities to which he is entitled. 
For example, a woman might also be disabled, be part of a national 
minority group that is barred from voting, and be tortured by the state in 
which she lives. Many of her essential human rights have been violated, but 
how is she to know which individual complaint mechanism to use? She 
qualifies under several different international human rights treaties and 
 
 200.  Laboni Amena Hoq, The Women’s Convention and Its Optional Protocol: Empowering 
Women to Claim Their Internationally Protected Rights, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 677, 685 
(2001). 
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identifying her by only one of her traits or allowing her to assert one set of 
her rights denies her both individual identity and agency over the human 
rights that the international community recognizes are vested in her. By 
asking her to choose which aspects of her identity she wishes to express 
and which of her human rights she wishes to assert, the international human 
rights law system is in fact denying her the active ability to assert herself, 
her full identity and her human rights, and is, in effect, reducing the 
benefits that it has created through the establishment of individual 
complaint mechanisms as accepted tools of international human rights law. 
Essentially, this example demonstrates that the more specific 
international human rights treaties perpetuate the very harm they claim to 
remedy: the broad human rights treaties’ failure to recognize the full 
identity of the individual. The flaw here, however, is in a fragmentation of 
identity rather than an overly broad or non-specific notion of rights 
protection. Ultimately, this diminishes the gains made by individuals in 
achieving access to the international human rights system by preventing 
them from enforcing the totality of the rights granted them by that system. 
CONCLUSION 
Human rights are at once a concern of all mankind and intensely 
personal rights that touch the core of individuality. They are in need of 
protection from violation by states and yet also are intangible entities that 
are individual in nature. This sense of duality permeates the key 
international human rights law treaties, which provide or will provide a 
place for the individual to assert and claim his human rights on the 
international stage. 
This article established the fundamental background of international 
human rights law, discussed the provisions of various individual complaint 
mechanisms contained in key international human rights law treaties, and 
then compared these mechanisms in order to highlight their importance. 
This discussion demonstrated the many points at which individuals are able 
to access international human rights law through individual complaints 
mechanisms. 
Next, this article argued that, while the prominence of the individual is 
crucial to assert and claim human rights, the plethora of international 
human rights law treaties threatens to fragment individual identity. In the 
process, several arguments and theories regarding the place of the 
individual in international human rights law were evaluated, with the 
benefits and pitfalls of these arguments analyzed. 
Rather than allow an ever more specialized international human rights 
treaty system to force the fragmentation of individual identity, this article 
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suggests that it is better to attend to the full array of individual identities 
that could be protected and asserted through already existing international 
human rights treaties. In this way, the international human rights law 
system could stave off the threat of a fragmented relationship to individuals 
by acknowledging all elements of the individual’s identity. 
 
